Si vous utilisez le blog à des fins de recherche ou de base de données, une citation du blog dans son ensemble et/ou d’articles de blog spécifiques serait appréciée. Beaucoup ont suggéré que je devrais transformer le blog en un service d’abonnement payant, mais j’ai résisté à le faire. Une référence appropriée à la façon dont le blog est utile à ses lecteurs aidera à maintenir cela ainsi.

La loi polonaise exige une forme écrite pour le transfert du droit d’auteur, ce qui n’est pas le cas de la loi allemande. [Said transfer may take various forms, whether by way of permanent assignment or temporary licence; but that distinction is not relevant to the conflict of laws analysis at issue]. C’est le déclencheur de l’affaire C-176/25 [Steizer]IU contre BT dans laquelle Emiliou AG s’est prononcée la semaine dernière.

Compte tenu de la différence entre les deux approches, quelle est la loi qui régit la question de la validité formelle de cette licence contractuelle, dans une réclamation du détenteur allemand (potentiellement exclusif) des droits d’auteur « BT » sur des photographies de tapis de sol de voiture (les faits ne sont pas si glamour…) prises par un photographe polonais, où cette validité est contestée par un tiers, « IU », défendeur dans le cadre d’une procédure en contrefaçon engagée par BT étant donné que IU a utilisé les mêmes photographies de tapis de sol de voiture pour illustrer les ventes sur eBay ?

IU soutient que BT n’a pas qualité pour agir, car il n’y a sans doute aucune mission valable de la part du photographe […] IU fait valoir que la validité de la cession des droits exclusifs d’utilisation des photographies est régie par le droit polonais, selon A4(2) Rome I : forum contractus déterminé par la résidence habituelle de la partie tenue d’effectuer la prestation caractéristique, sans doute le photographe polonais, résidant en Pologne. A11(1) Rome I [which the AG (44) calls ‘quasi-substantive (or ‘result oriented’) rules’: because A11 supports ‘favor negotis’: one of many potential laws may lead to the contract’s formal validity, in an effort not to let contracts stumble of conflict of laws formal validity roadblocks) then determines the law governing formal validity:

A contract concluded between persons who, or whose agents, are in the same country at the time of its conclusion is formally valid if it satisfies the formal requirements of the law which governs it in substance under this Regulation or of the law of the country where it is concluded.

Both alternatives in A11(1), in IU’s view, point to Polish law, and A53 of the Polish Law on copyright requires written form as defined in Article 78 of the Polish Civil Code for the assignment of rights of use in respect of copyright photographs.

By contrast, BT argues that German law applies as lex loci protectionis which , it says, is the relevant benchmark following A8(1) Rome II Regulation:

“The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising from an infringement of an intellectual property right shall be the law of the country for which protection is claimed. “

A8, BT suggest, applies to the act of disposal of the exclusive right of use (the Spaltungstheorie, or ‘splitting theory’, see below). Since an act of infringement took place in Germany, hence the right to use the photographs was also assigned in Germany,  BT asserts that the agreement on assignment of the rights of use is also governed by German law.

The ‘unitary theory’ in it seems mostly German speaking scholarship on Rome I and II, suggests all aspects of the right to use copyright works are governed by the principle of lex  loci contractus. This approach find support in A14(1) Rome I, according to which the property aspects of the assignment are uniformly governed by the contract law that applies to the underlying causal transaction.

The ‘splitting theory’ better IMO *bifurcation* (Spaltungstheorie) argues that only the act giving rise to obligations (titulus) is subject to the lex loci contractus, whereas the act of disposal (modus) is subject to the lex loci  protectionis.

The case therefore is very much one of applicable law shopping through claim qualification: if Rome I applies to this issue between BT and IU then BT will see its foundation for an infringement claim fall away. If Rome II applies then BT’s road to a successful infringement claim lies open.

The AG correctly imo opines that the formal validity of a contractual licence or assignment of copyright does not relate to ‘non contractual liability’, and that that issue should not be classified as ‘proprietary’, but rather as ‘contractual’.

Formal validity of a contractual licence or assignment of copyright does not relate to ‘non contractual liability’

This is the easy part of the Opinion, (52) ff.  As an example of Vorfrage (not a term the AG uses here), the issue of the validity of a contractual licence or assignment is preliminary to (and, thus, must logically be resolved by the court seised before) any discussion on whether the defendant infringed the copyright. The AG is absolutely right (54 – footnotes omitted)

the argument of BT that that validity issue should nevertheless be subsumed under the ‘non-contractual liability’ category when it arises in infringement proceedings, because it would be simpler for the court seised to determine the whole of the proceedings under the single substantive law designated by Article 8(1) of the Rome II Regulation, is misguided. In accordance with the general principles underpinning characterisation in conflicts of law, summarised in point 35 above, the conflict-of-law rules and, by extension, the law governing a given issue should depend on the nature of that issue, not the procedural context in which it is raised. Such an approach would entail the risk that, for instance, a given contractual licence or assignment be considered valid, under one set of substantive rules, when contested in infringement proceedings, but invalid, under another set of substantive rules, in the context of proceedings for determination of ownership (or counterclaim for invalidity of the assignment, and so on), and vice-versa. Such an outcome would be incompatible with the objectives of legal certainty and predictability underpinning the Rome I and Rome II Regulations.

The formal validity of a contractual licence or assignment of copyright is not a ‘proprietary’, but ‘contractual’ issue.

This is the part of the Opinion where the AG needs to cut through fog created by substantive law discussions. Copyright, like all intellectual property rights, is peculiar in that it creates intangible ideas into exclusive rights of ownership. Rome I, as the AG notes, implies parties should be free to choose the law applicable to their ‘contractual obligations’, yet they should not, by contrast, have that freedom with respect to the intrinsic characteristics of the copyright itself. (57, footnotes omitted)

The ‘proprietary’ category undoubtedly includes the primary issue of the transferability of the copyright concerned – that is, whether that right may be transferred at all from its initial owner (the author) to another person, in particular by effect of a contract.  Indeed, transferability  (and the extent thereof) constitutes an intrinsic characteristic of the right concerned. Accordingly, a copyright licence may only be granted, or assignment occur, through a contract if the law governing the right concerned permits it, irrespective of the law applicable to that contract.

In the case at issue, German law excludes the assignability of copyright, however it does allow exclusive licences such as the present one.

The AG suggests that if “the law governing a copyright allows its transfer by effect of a contract (which is the case here since, while German law excludes the assignability of copyright, it does allow exclusive licences such as the present one; [GAVC I do not see quite clearly why the AG does not involve Polish law in this analysis but that is probably linked to the lex loci protectionis issue and I am not an expert on intellectual property rights]), la question ultérieure de savoir si une licence contractuelle ou une cession de ce droit d’auteur doit se conformer à certaines exigences quant à la forme (y compris, ici, l’exigence d’un document écrit) concerne, en substance, non pas le droit « en tant que tel », mais le contrat sous-jacent.»

(73) toute exception formidable du droit allemand aux implications de la lex contractus polonaise peut être compensée par un argument de lois de police.

J’ai le sentiment que la CJUE ira plus vite au but, mais bien sûr, les avis de l’AG constituent un bon forum pour une réflexion plus approfondie.

Geert.